

From: [REDACTED] </O=ITHAKA/OU=FIRST ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=[REDACTED]>
Sent: Monday, October 18, 2010 10:04 AM
To: '[REDACTED]@MIT.EDU'; [REDACTED]
<[REDACTED]@ithaka.org>
Cc: [REDACTED]@mit.edu>
Subject: RE: 10:00 am Update: JSTOR Abuse at MIT: All IPs Blocked

Thanks [REDACTED],

I appreciate your candor here. I have dealt with many cases over the years and understand the difficulties inherent with tracking down individual users. I am hopeful we can use this opportunity to work together towards building more stable, sustainable and secured access to JSTOR. We are meeting as a larger group to discuss this matter further this afternoon and I am wondering if you could provide one point of clarification for that conversation.

Understanding that you may not be able to identify the individual, where you able to identify the credentials used to access MIT authorization for this activity? That is, was there a shared UN/PW used for guests or an open port on a proxy used in this case. Basically, the concern is, as we sort out the IP configurations necessary with you, could this or any user use the same authorization methodology to do this again or has the pathway been identified and locked down?

As for your IP configurations and establishing an access point within your range. We have the following IP addresses currently installed for MIT. Please let me know which ones to maintain and which to remove as needed and we'll get right to it.

18.*.*.*
128.30-31.*.*
128.52.*.*
129.55.*.*
192.52.61-66.*
198.125.160-163.*
198.125.176-192.*

Best,

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
JSTOR | Portico

[REDACTED]@ithaka.org
[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] [mailto:[REDACTED]@MIT.EDU]

Sent: Friday, October 15, 2010 5:04 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: 10:00 am Update: JSTOR Abuse at MIT: All IPs Blocked

Hello [REDACTED], I wanted to give you an update before the weekend.

At this time we have gone as far as we can in identifying the individual involved in these incidents. Our records and logs related to this activity do not allow us to definitively identify the guest. We appreciate your offer of more granular log information, but our IS&T group does not believe that such files will allow us to reach the point of identification.

We can, however, take a significant step to prevent recurrence by moving to the new protocol I'd mentioned below. Since it sounds as if that would be welcome and workable on the JSTOR end, I hope we can pursue that next week.

I would be happy to discuss any aspect of this with you further, and I'm sorry we do not have more details to report in terms of the incidents.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

MIT Libraries

P [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]@mit.edu

<http://libraries.mit.edu/scholarly>

Thank You [REDACTED],

I appreciate your response here. It appears we still have a ways to go to reach resolution, but I am glad to assist.

First, this activity is not continuing at the moment. Given that we saw it twice in two weeks, starting on a Saturday, I will hazard a guess that if this does recur, it will begin again on a Saturday. That said, if an when it does recur, we will be denying IP ranges significant enough to prevent it from continuing, while hopefully avoiding the need to block the entire range again. Internally, we are agreed on this point.

Second, we typically follow each case of excessive downloading with a three step process for considering the incident resolved...

1. Is it continuing? Not at the moment, but the jury is still out and will be for a few weeks.

2. Did the institution take the necessary steps to prevent recurrence? I see your suggestions here and have some thoughts on it as a follow on conversation. At present however, it is very important for us to understand if the users password has been changed and if the user has been contacted directly to address this issue. As a guest user, and likely the same user involved previously, using an efficient robot to grab lots of content, this is paramount to solve at the individual user level. If it is a shared account or used by multiple users, this is even more critical.

3. Was the content acquired deleted? This can be tricky, we understand, but if you can identify the user, in combination with adjusting their credentials, we must request that the best effort be made to insure that the content acquired is deleted from the storage device or web space in which they are storing it.

We can give you very granular log files from our end if identifying the user is problematic, but not identifying the user and assuring that the content is deleted, especially on an incident of this size, is a sizeable barrier to bringing this incident to a close.

As for your suggestion, we would gladly adjust the IPs that have access to JSTOR at your request. Note that some of our very large institutions do authenticate in this way. Also note that most very large institutions that do use proxy servers, use 2 or 3 to meet their bandwidth and access control needs. That said, I want to make sure we are on the same page here. Adjusting your configurations to prevent future occurrences is separate from bringing resolution to this incident.

If your IS&T group need additional information for activities between the time frames already provided, please do let me know what kind of information they are looking for and how much. Like, logs for at least 30 consecutive actions from an MIT IP between the times of 16:00 and 16:30 on Saturday, and we'll be happy to provide them.

Thanks,

■

-----Original Message-----

From: ■ [mailto:■@ithaka.org]

Sent: Friday, October 15, 2010 9:37 AM

To: ■

Cc: ■

Subject: RE: 10:00 am Update: JSTOR Abuse at MIT: All IPs Blocked

Dear ■,

I am wanting to keep you up to date on our findings here. I am copying an incident summary below for the two occurrences. I am hopeful that you understand our urgency as not intended to be confrontational at all, but as rooted in our deep investment in our ability to be good stewards of the content in our care. Noting that, the 9/25 and 9/26 incidents yielded more than 400K PDFs from JSTOR to this user. This is both unprecedented and very concerning. Any progress you could provide on identifying the user responsible and the steps I mentioned yesterday would be very helpful.

We are also mindful that the weekend is upon us and are looking for collaboration on your end and

acknowledgement that MIT staff will be monitoring your systems closely for any recurrence, as we are, until we can reach resolution.

Incident on 9/25 & 9/26

IP = 18.55.6.215
Start = 25-SEP-10 05:06:49.109524 PM
End = 26-SEP-10 04:24:54.297995 AM
Total Sessions = 1,256,249
Total Articles Downloaded = 453,570
Total Journals Affected = 562

Incident on 10/9

IP = 018.055.005.100
Start = 2010-10-09 14:53:18 from
End = 2010-10-09 19:08:01
Total Sessions = 8,515
Total Articles Downloaded = 8,422
Total Journal Affected = 714

Best,

██████████

-----Original Message-----

From: ██████████ [mailto:██████████@MIT.EDU]

Sent: Thursday, October 14, 2010 12:44 PM

To: ██████████

Cc: ██████████

Subject: RE: 10:00 am Update: JSTOR Abuse at MIT: All IPs Blocked

Hello ██████████ and ██████████,

Our investigations here point to the same guest that was involved in the 9/27 incident. We don't have enough information to follow the trail completely, but the signs suggest that the same guest user was responsible for this latest activity. To pursue this further, our IS&T group would need more information. Specifically, they are wondering if you are seeing any robotic activity from MIT currently and if so, whether you have any information about the IP addresses involved.

Given that it appears all of this excessive use was caused by a guest visitor at MIT, we have been considering next steps, and would like to suggest that we move to a new access model that will eliminate use by guests. We have recently developed an additional authorization layer that we can apply to particular products to prevent access by guests/walkins. We've tried this approach with one or two publishers where we had seen repeated excessive use, and it has stemmed the problem in those cases.

We would orchestrate this change by changing the proxy configuration on this end, and then we'd ask you to change the list of acceptable MIT IPs to only our proxy server's address -- a single IP.

If this sounds like an acceptable approach, let's discuss the next steps. To carry out the change, I'd have JSTOR work with [REDACTED], copied here.

Best,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
MIT Libraries

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]@mit.edu

<http://libraries.mit.edu/scholarly>

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] [mailto:[REDACTED]@ithaka.org]

Sent: Tuesday, October 12, 2010 10:09 AM

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: 10:00 am Update: JSTOR Abuse at MIT: All IPs Blocked

Hello Again,

We have requested that the IP range be unblocked at the firewall and that process is currently underway. I will confirm when that is accomplished and report the IPs and timestamps surrounding the event shortly.

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] [mailto:[REDACTED]@MIT.EDU]

Sent: Wednesday, September 29, 2010 4:24 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: JSTOR Abuse at MIT: All IPs Blocked

[REDACTED], thanks very much. We appreciate it.

Looking to the future, would it be possible to clarify that JSTOR will follow the protocol that was ultimately used here, shutting down not the class A range but the class C range, should an excessive use case emerge

again?

We have not had a history of excessive use of JSTOR content from MIT, so the problems do not seem at this time to be widespread. In addition, we are finding that the industry norm at this time is shut down of the specific offending IP.

We can see that in some cases (as here, where the initial suspension did not stop the misuse) moving to suspend the class C range is a reasonable response. But it would be very helpful on our end if we could work out an agreement that a shutdown of the class A range will not be part of the standard initial response protocol for excessive use cases.

We look forward to your thoughts --

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

MIT Libraries

P [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]@mit.edu

<http://libraries.mit.edu/scholarly>

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] [mailto:[REDACTED]@ithaka.org]

Sent: Wednesday, September 29, 2010 4:03 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: JSTOR Abuse at MIT: All IPs Blocked

Dear [REDACTED],

Thank you for your reply. I will ask our [REDACTED] staff to reinstate the suspended Class C range as soon as possible and will confirm once completed.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] [mailto:[REDACTED]@MIT.EDU]

Sent: Wednesday, September 29, 2010 4:01 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: FW: JSTOR Abuse at MIT: All IPs Blocked

Importance: High

Hello [REDACTED]

We've investigated this case and, because the origin of the activity was a guest visiting MIT, we believe it will not recur.

We hope you will be able to restore the class C range that has been suspended based on this information.

Thank you,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

MIT Libraries

P [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]@mit.edu

<http://libraries.mit.edu/scholarly>

From: [REDACTED]@jstor.org]

Sent: Sunday, September 26, 2010 12:31 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: JSTOR Abuse at MIT: All IPs Blocked

Dear [REDACTED],

I am writing you this afternoon to let you know that we have been forced to block access to JSTOR from MIT. Yesterday, around 6pm, we began to see hundreds of PDF downloads per minute occurring from multiple sessions at 18.55.6.215. As these requests began to affect performance of the public site, we were forced to deny access to this IP. Requests continued to pour in from this IP for some time, but were denied access. This clearly indicates robotic harvesting of PDFs which violates our Terms & Conditions of Use.

This morning, at around 8am, this activity started again from IP 18.55.6.216, forcing us to restrict access to the entire range of MIT IP addresses. We rarely take this level of response to abusive activity, but felt it necessary to maintain the stability of the web site for other institutions and users.

Once you have identified the responsible party and can assure us that this activity will not continue, we will be happy to restore access as soon as possible. That said, please note that the block had to be executed at the firewall level to prevent performance degradation (even after denying the PDF downloads, the requests themselves were so frequent it continued to be problematic) and thus will require coordination of our systems administrators to restore, which may take some time.

Please do let me know if I can be of additional assistance or if I can provide additional information. Having worked in this area for some time, I am well aware that this activity is normally a compromised username and password or a student/researcher unaware of the impact of their activities or that this method of gathering PDFs is in violation of our Terms and Conditions of Use. We routinely work with researchers through our dfr.jstor.org site or by providing data exports to accomplish the intended research aim and would be happy to do so in this case as well if that turns out to be the motivation.

Best,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

JSTOR

[REDACTED] <[mailto:\[REDACTED\]@ithaka.org](mailto:[REDACTED]@ithaka.org)>ithaka.org

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